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| <p>The development of a European defense policy need not wait for the formation of a European Union. As the activities of organizations such as NATO and the European Communities become increasingly interrelated, military-economic endeavors such as arms procurement lay the foundation for a European defense policy.</p> <p>Different economic, political, and military factors determine which countries are most important in the formation of a defense policy and which nations would only play a minor role. The US could take</p> | | |

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several actions which would aid in the formation of a European defense policy.

The concept of a defense policy evolving from economic and military cooperation is acceptable under neo-functionalist integration theory. While there are numerous plans for how this policy might develop, the key to the entire issue is in the European Council of the European Communities Heads of State. Any progress made toward a European defense policy through arms procurement cooperation will almost certainly begin with the Council.

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ARMS PROCUREMENT COOPERATION AND A
EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY

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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| <u>CHAPTER</u> | | <u>PAGE</u> |
|----------------|--|-------------|
| | Introduction. | 1 |
| I | The Development of European Cooperation. | 2 |
| II | The European Setting | 23 |
| III | Views of European Defense Cooperation | 61 |
| | Bibliography. | 81 |

INTRODUCTION

With the perception of a widening conventional force imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there is a search for a means to maintain a balance of power in Central Europe. The development of some form of European Union could improve the imbalance through a more efficient use of European resources and the development of a European defense policy, but such a step does not seem imminent.

However, there is the possibility that economic and military cooperation through organizations such as the European Communities and NATO could lead to the foundation of a European defense policy through increasingly integrative actions. It is this cooperation which will be examined for the possibility and likelihood of a European defense policy outside the context of a European Union.

CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION

The idea of a European defense policy is only a part of a concept of unity that has waxed and waned since the end of the Second World War. The present existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Communities (EC) testifies to the fact that there is still a perceived need for cooperative action.

If arms procurement and a European defense policy are to be examined, NATO and the EC must be the starting point. In NATO there is the first example of a multilateral defense treaty backed up by a standing military organizational structure among sovereign states. For its part, the EC is the most significant joint economic undertaking by independent states. Through the EC member states have given certain of their own powers to a supranational body for the good of the whole.¹ The customs union called for in the Treaty of Rome has been developed further towards a common market. With the European Monetary System (EMS) now underway, there appears to be progress towards an economic union. This economic union would be a common market with some provisions for common monetary, fiscal and other governmental policies.² Other European organizations such as the Western European Union and the Council of Europe serve useful purposes as intergovernmental consultative bodies but do not have the critical features of NATO or the EC.

Because of their unique nature and the key roles played by these organizations in European politics, it is useful if we briefly examine the birth of these organizations and the factors which caused them to develop as they did.

The nature of post-war Europe is such that the examination of events falls into three historical periods which we will utilize to examine the events: 1945 through 1955, 1956 through 1967 and 1968 through 1979.

1945-1955

The end of the Second World War saw Europe in shambles with a potentially dangerous enemy nearby in the shape of the Soviet Union. The Soviets continued to militarily occupy the East European nations they had liberated from the Nazis. Even though decisions regarding Germany were ostensibly to be decided by the Allies as a whole, the Soviets began to take unilateral actions in regards to the portion of Germany they were occupying. As the Soviet presence continued just across the border from Western Europe and Communist parties grew in the post-war Western governments of countries such as France and Italy, the United States felt it necessary to step in to fill the vacuum of power created by the war.³

In 1947 the European Recovery Program, commonly known as the Marshall Plan, was introduced to the European governments. An impetus to European integration was provided by the US requirement contained in the plan that the European nations coordinate their needs to insure that the fullest utilization could be made of the assistance.⁴ This requirement brought about the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which worked to organize European needs.

Meanwhile, France and Great Britain had signed the Treaty of Dunkirk to pledge one another to mutual defense assistance against any further German aggression. In addition, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Mediterranean meant that the US would have to take action in Greece if the Communist rebels were to be kept from taking over. This support was expressed in coordination with the economic assistance the US was giving to Europe and was developed into the Truman Doctrine which said that the US would give any country economic and military assistance to help keep itself independent and to contain Communism.⁵

In 1948 the perceived need among the West European nations for defense cooperation caused the Treaty of Dunkirk to be expanded to become the Brussels Treaty with the addition of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.⁶ Following the Soviet overthrow of the moderate government of Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the Berlin Blockade that same year, the Western allies began to see the need for the continued expansion of their cooperation. While all the Western allies worked to keep Berlin supported, this mutual cooperation grew into the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), with the member nations being the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Iceland and Portugal.⁷ The Berlin Blockade ended in 1949 bringing with it the formal constitution of the Federal Republic.

At the same time the French government had proposed at the consultative meeting of the Brussels Treaty Powers in July of 1948 that a Federal European Parliament should be developed and an economic and customs union established. All BTO powers with the exception of Great Britain were enthusiastic. The Council of Europe Treaty was signed by

all five powers on 5 May 1949 and was heralded at the time as the first step towards a European political union. However, in order to get Great Britain to join, the powers of the organization were weakened so much that it became strictly a consultative body.⁸

In 1949 the International Ruhr Authority was formed by France, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg with the Federal Republic as an observer. This was supposed to control Germany's industrial might and help the other nations' steel industries but neither France nor the Federal Republic was satisfied with it. France was worried that it did not control German industrial might sufficiently. Since the Federal Republic was again becoming a free nation, it did not approve of the inferior status in which it was placed by the Authority.⁹

With the perceived military and political cooperation of the Brussels Treaty Organization and Council of Europe now achieved, the head of the French post-war Planning Commission, Jean Monnet, produced a proposal which he felt might further his goal of European unity through expansion into the field of economic matters. Mr Monnet's suggestion was to create a European Coal and Steel Community which would have a supranational governing body to control West European steel production. Seeing that this would provide an effective check on German industrial power, the French Foreign Minister Schumann accepted the plan which came to bear his name. In the Federal Republic, Chancellor Adenauer saw this as a move to gain equal status with the other European nations. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy were quick to accept the proposal. Only Great Britain refused, claiming that no organization could be allowed to have a final say over British actions.¹⁰ In July 1952 the treaty came into

effect and the High Commission began to work. In the first few years the organization operated smoothly enough to show that a supranational structure was feasible.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, the NAT had no permanent structure, but rather was still only a collective agreement similar to earlier defense treaties. The commitment of US forces in Korea, and the fear that conflict might break out in Europe caused the US to propose changes. The US informed its European allies that if they wanted the US to maintain substantial forces in Europe they would have to increase their troop concentration in Europe and make provisions for the Federal Republic to contribute towards the European defense.

Since most French forces were committed in Indochina, the French government was firmly against any German rearmament. So unwilling were the French to allow the reemergence of the German military that the French Prime Minister Plevin proposed a European Defense Community (EDC) within which there would be no room for any national German army. This EDC would provide for the common defense of member states under a European Defense Minister. Military units of the member states would be integrated at the lowest possible level, they would have one budget and would have a single arms program. All European NATO members and the Federal Republic were invited to the negotiations. Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and later the Netherlands accepted and by early 1952 a draft treaty had been decided on.¹¹

The organization outlined in the treaty was not the super organization many have perceived it to be. While many advocates of the EDC were spurred on by the success of the ECSC, the EDC was still more

of an intergovernmental organization than a supranational one. Only continental forces were included, not those utilized overseas. The institutions of the EDC mirrored those of the ECSC. It was to have a parallel Council of Ministers and High Commission, and to share the same Assembly and High Court. Since the Council with its member-nation representatives had the final say its supranational powers were limited.

However, as the ratification process began, numerous problems arose. While the treaty was quickly accepted by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, Italy refused to ratify until it received benefits or a reward for its cooperation. The Treaty was not received enthusiastically in the Federal Republic, but Chancellor Adenauer defended the treaty by pointing out the sovereignty it would restore to Germany and the equality it would then have among European states. In the French Parliament the treaty steadily lost the support it had when the idea had first emerged. It was accepted only on the condition that Britain be closely associated with the EDC. When the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952, the British government signed an agreement that in case of attack on any EDC member, Great Britain would automatically send military aid. In addition, a protocol was added to the North Atlantic Treaty declaring that an attack against any EDC member would be considered as an attack against all NATO members. These assurances were considered insufficient, so successive French governments attempted to get Britain to commit itself to keep British troops on the continent. However, Great Britain refused to make any additional assurances.

This refusal by Great Britain was used as a major reason against

French participation.¹² If Britain would give up nothing then neither would France. In addition, the reason for the EDC's existence in the first place seemed to be disappearing. The Korean War was now over, Stalin was dead and tensions with the Soviets were lessening. In light of this, the treaty was voted down by the French Parliament and the whole question was dropped.

Unfortunately this did not solve the matter of the US keeping its forces in Europe at the levels which the European allies desired since the Federal Republic's rearmament was a precondition which had not been met. Therefore, in October of 1954 after several weeks of negotiations a suggestion of British Prime Minister Eden was accepted in what is known as the Paris Agreements. The Federal Republic and Italy would join the Brussels Treaty Organization which would then be renamed the Western European Union (WEU), under whose guidance German rearmament would take place. As members of the WEU, Italy and the Federal Republic would become full members of NATO. While Germany would become fully sovereign, three limitations were stipulated: allied troops would remain in the country; the Federal Republic would never produce atomic, biological, or nuclear weapons; and its army would not exceed twelve divisions without the unanimous approval of all WEU members.

Interestingly enough, Britain promised to maintain four divisions and the Tactical Air Force on the continent and not remove them against the wishes of a majority of Brussels Treaty powers. Had this same commitment been made earlier to France, there is a strong possibility that the EDC treaty would have passed the French Parliament and gone into effect.¹³

While these actions did enable the rearmament of the Federal Republic to proceed and made for a standing military structure under NATO, the defeat of the EDC was a crushing defeat to the advocates of further European integration. In its original structure the EDC had some supranational characteristics, but in addition article 38 of the treaty called on the Assembly of the EDC to establish a future European Political Community (EPC). Having thus tied the EPC to the success of the EDC, the death of one ended for the time being discussion of either.¹⁴

So by the end of 1955 the need for such extensive cooperation was no longer perceived as crucial. In particular the Soviet withdrawal from Austria helped to lessen the fears of the West and weaken their common resolve. Once again, the Soviets unintentionally helped to bring the Western allies together.

1956-1967

On the political front, 1956 saw uprisings in Poland in June and in Hungary in October. In both cases Soviet troops intervened and in Hungary the case was clearly brought home by the massive number of refugees who fled to the West. These acts themselves would have provided a great impetus to a closing of ranks among the Western nations, except for the actions of France and Great Britain in the Suez.

When France and Great Britain occupied the Suez Canal in conjunction with the Israelis in October, they were unpleasantly surprised to discover the US and the Soviet Union join together in condemning their action. In fact, their occupation of the Suez did much to aid the Soviets by drawing attention away from its own intervention into

Hungary. France and Britain had been duly notified that they were no longer major powers who could unilaterally act as they saw fit throughout the world. While they were exceptionally upset with the US for not supporting their actions, the increasing activities of the Soviets in the Eastern European satellites made it necessary that they continue to depend on the support of the US.

Prior to the intervention of Great Britain and France into the Suez in 1956, the six members of the ECSC had agreed on suggestions which had come out of the Messina Conference in May 1955. These ideas were originated by the Netherlands during the 1952 EDC negotiations. At that time certain political and military integration had seemed certain in the EDC, so the need for accompanying economic union seemed obvious.¹⁵ Following the defeat of the EDC by the French National Assembly, a call for a supranational community to create a customs union which could lead to an economic union was made by Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to their three partners in the ECSC. They decided to expand the organization to include a common market and to deal with atomic energy. By the first of 1957 a proposed treaty known as the Treaty of Rome had been drawn up which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM) to join the ECSC. With little problem in any country the treaties were approved and the European Communities came into effect on 1 January 1958.

While the two Berlin crises of 1958 had kept the spectre of Soviet power alive, the return of Charles DeGaulle to power in France caused a steady tension within the Atlantic and European framework of cooperation. Degaulle's own philosophy was that institutions such as

the EC should only come about as a final phase in the integrative process. He felt there should be an agreement among states on the political aims of integration, then a policy formulation process. Only then should institutions be developed forming a federal union of sovereign states.¹⁶ However, because of the furor France had caused earlier over its refusal to ratify the EDC treaty, DeGaulle did not feel he could safely withdraw from the EC without causing a total collapse of French influence in Europe. So as an alternative he chose to do all possible to contain the independent actions of the EC.

On the NATO front, DeGaulle resented the idea of the US as the major voice of the organization and so he suggested a ruling triumvirate of France, Great Britain, and the US. These three would set the policies and goals of the Alliance. When this measure received no support from the US or the European allies, France withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from the NATO framework and ceased its coordination with other NATO naval forces.¹⁷ In the meantime, France refused to accept US nuclear weapons and exploded its own A-bomb in 1959.

DeGaulle still desired that there be some form of federation of nations before any more economic goals of the Treaty of Rome were attained. With this in mind the French member of a Head of State conference committee submitted a plan which would provide for a Union of States. This came to be known as the Fouchet Plan.¹⁸ The goals of this union would be to adopt a common foreign policy, cooperation in science and culture, defense of human rights, and the strengthening of the security of member states.

Some of the EC members found portions of this union questionable

since it would have removed some of the supranational characteristics of the EC Commission. Furthermore, membership would be limited to Council of Europe members who were also members of the EC. New members to the EC would require unanimous approval of the newly formed political union before they could join.¹⁹ This was enough for Belgium and the Netherlands to insist on Britain's EC membership prior to approval of the Fouchet Plan. Since DeGaulle insisted on the opposite, any progress was unlikely. The whole plan was weakened by Britain showing no interest in the plan itself. Negotiations for some sort of compromise continued through most of 1962, but the refusal of the Netherlands and Belgium to come to terms with France effectively stopped the plan.

Going on simultaneously with the negotiations of the Fouchet committee was Britain's negotiations for entry into the EC, without political union agreements. The last straw for DeGaulle was Britain's acceptance of US nuclear submarines and Polaris missiles to be committed to the NATO deterrence. So when France's Fouchet plan for political union had been reduced to the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963, DeGaulle unilaterally put an end to Britain's EC negotiations with a veto.²⁰

In 1965 France again began to put pressure on NATO for a greater say. DeGaulle again called for a ruling triumvirate to control NATO, again with no success. That year NATO land and sea maneuvers were held without French participation. The following year DeGaulle ordered that all Allied troops on French soil must be placed under French command or removed. When the NATO choice was to remove them, France withdrew from NATO's military structure and NATO headquarters (SHAPE) moved to Brussels in 1967.²¹

When Britain again tried to enter the EC in 1967 France again vetoed that attempt in spite of the pro-European view taken by Prime Minister Wilson.²² Despite many efforts by Britain and the Five of the EC to take whatever steps possible to further trade and cooperation between them, French intransigence in any dealing with Britain sealed the matter.

In the spirit of Detente DeGaulle had earlier been normalizing relations with Eastern Europe. The Grand Coalition of Kiesinger and Brandt in the Federal Republic was attempting to develop Brandt's concept of Ostpolitik. In light of the easing of tensions, Britain and the US again decided to reduce the forces stationed in Germany. Again something was needed to give a push to cooperation among the Western Allies and once again this push was supplied by the Soviet Union.

1968-1979

When troops from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary invaded Czechoslovakia on the 20th of August 1968, the Western allies were forced to realize that the post-war threat which had originally created the Atlantic Alliance was still very much in existence. The well-coordinated and effective attack by the Warsaw Pact countries on one of their own members showed NATO the lengths to which those powers would go to maintain a unified front. This forced NATO to reexamine its own defense readiness in light of the now proven capabilities of its potential adversary.

Just prior to the Czechoslovakian invasion, France had vetoed Britain's second attempt at EC membership. Following this action,

France's five EC partners and Great Britain turned to the WEU as a forum for cooperation outside the EC. In October 1968 the Harmel report was issued within NATO which called for the WEU to be utilized to institutionalize political cooperation, extend defense cooperation in light of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and cooperate further in the fields of technology and monetary policy. This proposal was then submitted to the WEU Council of Ministers where France had no veto.²³

In an attempt to diffuse this development, DeGaulle approached the Foreign Minister of Britain, Lord Soames, with the idea of forming a European association with France and Great Britain at the lead. This would be an intergovernmental arrangement which would supersede the need for NATO and the EC. Great Britain was willing to discuss the issue but refused to consider abandoning NATO. Additionally, Britain proceeded to inform its European allies of the matters under discussion. All other EC members found the concept objectionable and decided to begin the political consultations within the WEU. France then absented itself from WEU meetings until it was assured of the organization's not being involved in political matters. France feared the possibility of Great Britain's use of the WEU to gain influence or to compete with the EC, but there was also the fact that following Great Britain's handling of the Soames incident there could be no question of French-British cooperation for the moment.²⁴

While by late 1969 some of the moves towards East-West reconciliation such as the Ostpolitik of now Chancellor Willy Brandt and the French rapprochement with Eastern Europe that had begun under DeGaulle began again, there was a reaffirmation of commitment to the Atlantic Alliance

as the framework of any inter-bloc cooperation. In October 1969

Chancellor Willy Brandt said:

The North Atlantic Alliance which has proved a value in the twenty years of its existence will guarantee our security also in the future. Its firm solidarity is the prerequisite of joint efforts to reach a relaxation of tensions in Europe.²⁵

Following the resignation of DeGaulle in April 1969, his successor as President, Georges Pompidou, began to work more closely with the other West European nations. The prime example was in 1970 when Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway began to negotiate entry into the EC with the approval of France. It was also at this time that France returned to the WEU. In January 1972 the EC of Six became the EC of Ten as all four became members. A negative referendum in Norway caused that nation to withdraw and so the Nine came into being.²⁶

The Nine and NATO were confronted with a crisis the following year with the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. With the exception of Portugal, European members of NATO refused to allow the US to utilize any of their facilities to aid in the resupply of Israel during the war. This situation had come about because the EC had not developed any common energy policy and each European nation took independent action to try and protect its oil supply.

This situation had been construed by many as a great crisis of the NATO alliance but in all fairness to the European members of NATO, the Yom Kippur War was not a situation which could be made to fit easily into the North Atlantic Treaty's call for mutual support. In a study done by the Rand Corporation, Horst Mendershausen compares the solidarity of NATO members during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the lack

of solidarity during the Arab-Israeli War and draws several interesting conclusions. One is that the difference in solidarity reflects a difference in two constellations of conflict rather than an overall lessening of cooperation. Not aiding a member of the alliance in an area outside the authority of the NAT did not and does not need to be equated with a lessening of their collective commitment.²⁷ This helps to explain why a situation which seemed so ominous has not had the feared effects of causing greater disunity within NATO or the EC.

On the contrary, since that crisis NATO has attempted to increase its cooperative efforts in weapons and training, primarily through the efforts of an informal subgroup of the organization known as the Eurogroup. This organization consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and Great Britain was formed in 1968 at the suggestion of Britain as Europe's answer to the growing strength of the Warsaw Pact as had been shown in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.²⁸

The role of such an organization has increased in the ensuing decade due to the growing perception of an increased Soviet threat. In 1968 NATO could lay claim to larger military forces and expenditures and in most areas a qualitative superiority in weaponry over the Warsaw Pact.²⁹ Now it is dramatically outnumbered, outgunned, and outspent by a region with much fewer resources. Even the qualitative edge that NATO clung to so tenaciously has disappeared. The Warsaw Pact has no problem of standardization due to the supply of major equipment from the Soviet Union. This then simplifies the logistical situation by making the Soviet logistical system adaptable to all Warsaw Pact nations.³⁰

What this calls for is a more efficient use of defense funds rather than any major increases in defense spending. To quote General Robert Close:

The past thirty years have witnessed an incalculable waste of tens of billions of dollars of American and European defense resources - manpower, money, energy, materials and structures. NATO has not provided the maximum defense possible for the resources available, or the resources expended... Every Allied nation determines what it will buy, when, in what quantity, and for what military purpose. Unnecessary duplication (indeed multiplication) of Allied defense efforts abounds. Logistical support for what General Johannes Standoff called 'a museum of weapons systems' is provided by fourteen national defense ministries for thirty-nine armed services. No wonder that NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns spoke of 'a logistics nightmare that may well prove impossible to support.'³¹

The particular efforts of the Eurogroup to solve these problems will be discussed in Chapter II.

Within the EC development has been slow and difficult. In December 1969 there was a summit of the Six to try and determine the future of the EC. Discussion centered around completion of Treaty of Rome requirements, development of integration not required by the Treaty of Rome such as economic and monetary policies, and enlargement of the Community.

France desired completion of Treaty requirements prior to enlargement. In particular, it wished a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) established prior to any enlargement. While the Federal Republic wished enlargement to occur first, France's intransigence carried the day and the nations agreed to establish a CAP by the end of 1969. France achieved its desire in this matter, and all members were talking once again. The last obstacle was removed from Great Britain entering the EC. In addition, with the start of the CAP, the European Parliament was given certain budgetary powers. While it cannot force changes in obligatory spending

which constitutes roughly three-quarters of the money, it can recommend changes and freeze the entire budget at the previous year's level if it so desires.³²

Despite the claims by member nations that the EC is strictly an economic organization, certain actions beginning in 1970 showed that the increasing interrelationship of economics and politics needed to be considered. In July 1970 the Davignon Report on political cooperation was adopted by the EC. It called for foreign policy cooperation through the exchange of information and regular consultation on important political issues. The Commission would be invited when matters were related to the EC and the European Parliament would be informed twice each year.³³ In spite of these additional attempts at working together, issues such as monetary union and a common energy policy seemed distant. We have already seen how this lack of an energy policy carried over into NATO during the 1973 Mid-East War and oil embargo.

Following the growth of the EC from six to nine members, the attempts at political cooperation continued. It was agreed that four times each year the Foreign Ministers would all meet to discuss foreign policy matters. All of this was outside the framework of the Treaty of Rome and meant the Constitution of the EC was acquiring an unwritten basis along the lines of that of Great Britain in addition to its written foundation.³⁴

These efforts which came to be known as European Political Cooperation (EPC) were further expanded in 1973 through the efforts of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. He advocated three-times yearly summit meetings of the Nine. This then was known as the European

Council. According to Richard Vaughan:

...the EEC has since 1974 possessed what it lacked before, a single all-powerful institution which is in a position to lay down programmes of future activities, create new policies and modify old ones, and solve disputes by making compromises at the highest level.³⁵

The actions of the European Council are still guided by national concerns, but the framework for further cooperation is present.

In 1979 two other developments have occurred which hold a potential for further European cooperation. In March 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) was instituted among all of the EC except Great Britain. Britain had promised to try and maintain its currency as if it were a member. The EMS seems to be operating better than expected, but no one is yet certain if the monetary union called for by the end of 1981 will be feasible at that time.³⁶

Secondly, in May of 1979 the European Parliament was directly elected by the general population of the EC nations. While the previous European Parliament had made some interesting proposals such as the Tindemanns Report on Political Cooperation and the Klepsch Report on a Unified European Arms Procurement policy, the new Parliament has quickly begun to assert its meager powers.³⁷

Summary

We have seen how the present natures of NATO and the EC are more the results of reactive than of active policy. The presence of a common enemy helped to give birth to NATO and has reappeared in different forms often enough to continue to supply NATO with a purpose.

The Treaty of Dunkirk expanded to the Brussels Treaty, then became the North Atlantic Treaty. Then the WEU was expanded to accomodate

West German rearmament and its military structure was given to NATO. Finally in 1966 NATO expanded its military planning to an actual standing military staff. Despite the withdrawal of France and Greece from the military structure, joint exercises and planning have expanded in the late 1970's.

On the side of civilian power, the ECSC grew out of the desire to control the industrial power of the new Federal Republic of Germany. The ECSC then developed into the EC and expanded from six members to nine members.

The EC has developed to a point where the European Council is attempting to reach common views on many political issues. The overlap in membership of the organizations discussed and the increasing interrelationships in military and economic matters brings us to the point of arms procurement and the role it might play in further development of a European defense policy.

FOOTNOTES

¹The European Community, European Community: The Facts (Washington, 1974), p. 2

²Richard G. Lipsey, "Economic Unions" International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, VII, 542

³Max Jansen, History of European Integration: 1945-1975 (Amsterdam: Europa Institute, University of Amsterdam, 1975), p. 10

⁴Ibid., p. 13

⁵Ibid., p. 11

⁶Richard Vaughan, Twentieth Century Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 73

⁷Jansen, op. cit., p. 26

⁸Vaughan, op. cit., p. 91

⁹Jansen, op. cit., p. 33

¹⁰Vaughan, op. cit., p. 105

¹¹Robert Close, Europe Without Defence? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 44-46

¹²Ibid., p. 47

¹³Ibid., p. 54

¹⁴Ibid., p. 49

¹⁵Vaughan, op. cit., p. 130

¹⁶Jansen, op. cit., p. 75

¹⁷Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 86

¹⁸Jansen, op. cit., p. 84

¹⁹Jansen, op. cit., p. 85

²⁰Jansen, op. cit., p. 87

²¹Beer, op. cit., p. 90

²²Jansen, op. cit., p. 105

²³NATO Information Service, NATO: Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1978), p. 342

²⁴Jansen, op. cit., p. 108

²⁵Willy Brandt, "German Foreign Policy," Survival, XI (December 1969) 371

²⁶Jansen, op. cit., p. 123

²⁷Horst Mendershausen, Outlook on Western Solidarity: Political Relations in the Atlantic Alliance System (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1976)

²⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Eurogroup (Brussels, 1979), p. 2

²⁹International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1968-1969 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969)

³⁰Ibid., 1979-1980, p. 110

³¹Close, op. cit., p. 139

³²The Economist (London), November 17, 1979, p. 62

³³Vaughan, op. cit., p. 216

³⁴Vaughan, op. cit., p. 217

³⁵Vaughan, op. cit., p. 217

³⁶The Economist (London), December 15, 1979, p. 45

³⁷The Economist (London), December 15, 1979, p. 44

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN SETTING

As we have seen, Western Europe is the scene of two major organizations revolving around military and economic cooperation: NATO and the European Community. NATO has just begun its fourth decade, as strong or as weak as ever, depending on one's point of view. The European Community has not led to political union by 1980 as hoped for by some, but neither has it crumbled in disunity as expected by others.

In the modern world it is no longer possible for these two organizations to proceed in ignorance of one another. The military power of a nation is closely related to its economic power. The growing financial, economic, and strategic implications of the development, procurement, and trade in arms are making it imperative that nations consider the entire relationship when making economic or military decisions.

Therefore, a European defense policy need not begin as a unified foreign policy within a political union, but could realistically begin with efforts to rationalize weapons procurement and to fully utilize money now wasted on duplicative efforts between NATO members.

As long as Western Europe continues to perceive the Soviet threat that gave NATO its birth and its continued need for existence, economic necessity dictates that defense cooperation develop so that national

defense and economic stability and growth do not become competing concepts.

If we are to discuss a European defense policy, a major issue is to determine which nations would participate. The first chapter discussed the development of Atlantic and West European organizations. Their members must be the first point of departure. However, the fact that these organizations include North American nations and that some European nations are members of neither means that we must examine the region more closely.

First we will examine the membership of these organizations and the other nations in the region to see which would or would not be involved in the development of a European defense policy. Then we shall briefly summarize the structure and operation of the organizations which might be involved in further defense cooperation. From this we will be able to determine their strengths and weaknesses as they relate to the goal of European defense cooperation. Finally, we will examine the political, economic, and military problems inherent in attempts by these nations and organizations to maintain an effective deterrent.

The Participants

An attempt to discuss West European defense policy must first define the roles the various nations would play. Since NATO, the EC, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) will be discussed, their membership must be considered. (Table 1) The only nations not in at least one of these organizations and yet considered closely related to the listed nations are Austria, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, all of whom except Spain are neutral.

On the basis of several factors, the different nations will be

separated as to the perceived need for their participation. (Table 1, Col. 5) Through combinations of economic and military strength, political stability, foreign policy roles, and regional involvement the participation of certain nations in a defense policy would be essential while that of others might be marginally useful or even counterproductive. The two North American members of NATO, Canada and the United States, will be considered separately.

The statistics of tables 2-4 are the basis for a portion of this determination. The importance of individual figures will be addressed as the specific nations are examined.

The Role of Nations

European

Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany are considered the key nations, or inner-core, of a European defense policy for a number of reasons. While France has withdrawn from the military framework of NATO, all three are major members of all the organizations we are considering. If any cooperative effort is to succeed, these three would form the nucleus of the effort through their predominance in several areas.

Economically the three are the largest in the region as reflected by their GNPs and their import and export balance. While Great Britain has the most severe economic problems of the three, its new self-sufficiency in oil helps to improve the situation.

The dominance of these three nations as trading partners and in industry among the other European nations is also a major factor. (Table 3, Col. 3-4) When all of this is taken in conjunction with their political

TABLE I

| <u>Country</u> | <u>NATO(1)</u> | <u>IEPG(2)</u> | <u>WEU(3)</u> | <u>EC(4)</u> | <u>(5)</u> |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| Federal Republic of Germany | X | X | X | X | INNER CORE |
| France | X | X | X | X | |
| Great Britain | X | X | X | X | |
| Belgium | X | X | X | X | OUTER CORE |
| Italy | X | X | X | X | |
| Netherlands | X | X | X | X | |
| Denmark | X | X | | X | PERIPHERY |
| Greece | X | X | | * | |
| Iceland | X | | | | |
| Luxembourg | X | X | X | X | |
| Norway | X | X | | | |
| Portugal | X | X | | | |
| Spain | | | | 0 | EXTERNAL |
| Turkey | X | X | | 0 | |
| Austria | | | | | |
| Ireland | | | | X | |
| Sweden | | | | | |
| Switzerland | | | | | |
| Canada | X | | | | |
| US | X | | | | |

X = Member
 * = Accepted
 0 = Applied for Membership

TABLE 2

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH, 1977

| Country | GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT | | FOREIGN TRADE | | | | (6) Exports as % of GNP |
|-------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|--|----------------------------|
| | (1) Tot. Billion \$ | (2) Per Capita \$ | (3) (CIF) Billion Dollars | (4) (FOB) Billion Dollars | (5) BALANCE | | |
| F.R.G. | 514.4 | 8,379 | 102.4 | 119.8 | +17.4 | | 23.3 |
| France | 379.2 | 7,144 | 70.5 | 63.5 | -7.0 | | 16.7 |
| G.B. | 245.2 | 4,390 | 63.7 | 57.5 | -6.2 | | 23.5 |
| Belgium | 80.5 | 8,184 | 40.2 | 37.5 | -2.7 | | 45.1 |
| Italy | 195.2 | 3,459 | 47.6 | 45.0 | -2.6 | | 23.1 |
| Neth. | 105.6 | 7,627 | 45.6 | 43.7 | -1.9 | | 41.4 |
| Denmark | 43.9 | 8,617 | 13.3 | 10.1 | -3.2 | | 22.9 |
| Greece | 26.7 | 2,875 | 6.8 | 2.7 | -4.1 | | 10.2 |
| Iceland | 1.8 | 8,188 | 0.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 | | 28.4 |
| Lux. | 2.6 | 7,194 | included in Belgium..... | | | | |
| Norway | 35.2 | 8,713 | 12.9 | 8.7 | -4.2 | | 24.8 |
| Portugal | 16.7 | 1,705 | 5.0 | 2.0 | -3.0 | | 12.1 |
| Spain | 115.0 | 3,164 | 17.8 | 10.2 | -7.6 | | 8.9 |
| Turkey | 45.5 | 1,080 | 5.7 | 1.7 | -4.0 | | 3.8 |
| Austria | 47.9 | 6,367 | 14.2 | 9.8 | -4.4 | | 20.4 |
| Ireland | 9.4 | 2,925 | 5.4 | 4.4 | -1.0 | | 46.9 |
| Sweden | 78.2 | 9,470 | 20.1 | 19.1 | -1.0 | | 24.4 |
| Switzerland | 63.6 | 10,047 | 17.9 | 17.5 | -0.4 | | 27.6 |
| Canada | 197.0 | 8,447 | 39.5 | 41.6 | +2.1 | | 21.1 |
| US | 1,887.2 | 8,704 | 147.8 | 120.2 | -27.6 | | 6.4 |

U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Indicators of Comparative East-West Economic Strength, 1977
 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978)

TABLE 3

TRADE OF EUROPEAN NATO* NATIONS - 1979

| Origin of Destination | VALUE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS | | AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE OF EACH COUNTRY | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---|------------|
| | (1) IMPORTS (CIF) | (2) EXPORTS (FOB) | (3) IMPORT | (4) EXPORT |
| 1 F.R.G. | 65,990.4 | 59,933.7 | 13.6 | 12.7 |
| France | 42,762.1 | 45,581.4 | 8.8 | 9.6 |
| G.B. | 24,565.7 | 30,504.1 | 5.1 | 6.4 |
| 2 Belgium | 31,135.0 | 33,899.7 | 6.4 | 7.2 |
| Italy | 29,623.8 | 26,223.0 | 6.1 | 5.5 |
| Neth. | 37,281.5 | 33,444.7 | 7.7 | 7.1 |
| Denmark | 6,770.6 | 8,118.0 | 1.4 | 1.7 |
| Greece | 2,231.1 | 4,098.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| Iceland | 260.9 | 386.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 3 Lux. | included in Belgium... | | | |
| Norway | 6,959.9 | 5,005.0 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Portugal | 1,558.9 | 2,539.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| Spain | 7,606.8 | 6,835.8 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
| Turkey | 1,106.9 | 2,032.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| 4 Austria | 6,814.9 | 10,854.5 | 1.4 | 2.3 |
| Ireland | 4,785.9 | 5,383.4 | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| Sweden | 13,264.8 | 11,659.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 |
| Switz. | 14,960.6 | 18,661.9 | 3.1 | 3.9 |
| 5 Canada | 5,299.6 | 4,128.5 | 1.1 | 0.9 |
| US | 36,816.8 | 30,437.0 | 7.6 | 6.4 |

*(All nations in first three groups except Spain.)

U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Trade Patterns of the West, 1978, Special Report no. 63
 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979)

TABLE 4

| | Population Mid-1977 (Millions)(1) | Numbers in Armed Forces (Thousands)(2) | COMPARATIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES-1979 Overall \$Million(3) | \$ Per Head(4) | As % of GNP(5) |
|----------|---|--|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| F.R.G. | 61.48 | 495.0 | 24,391 | 396 | 3.4 |
| France | 53.08 | 509.3 | 18,776 | 349 | 3.3 |
| G.B. | 55.85 | 322.9 | 17,572 | 314 | 4.7 |
| Belgium | 9.83 | 86.8 | 3,636 | 363 | 3.5 |
| Italy | 56.45 | 365.0 | 7,089 | 124 | 2.4 |
| Neth. | 13.85 | 114.8 | 4,767 | 338 | 3.3 |
| Denmark | 5.09 | 34.7 | 1,559 | 303 | 2.4 |
| Greece | 9.28 | 184.6 | 1,523 | 163 | 4.7 |
| Iceland | 0.22 | no military... | | | |
| Lux. | 0.36 | 0.7 | 42 | 116 | 1.1 |
| Norway | 4.04 | 39.0 | 1,421 | 347 | 3.2 |
| Portugal | 9.77 | 60.5 | 587 | 60 | 2.8 |
| Spain | 36.35 | 315.5 | 3,370 | 90 | 1.8 |
| Turkey | 42.13 | 566.0 | 2,591 | 58 | 4.5 |
| Austria | 7.52 | 38.0 | 857 | 114 | 1.2 |
| Ireland | 4.74 | 14.6 | 192(78) | 59(78) | 1.6(78) |
| Sweden | 8.26 | 68.6 | 3,328 | 400 | 3.4 |
| Switz. | 6.33 | 18.5 | 1,842 | 292 | 1.9 |
| Canada | 23.32 | 80.0 | 3,721 | 157 | 2.3 |
| US | 216.80 | 2,022.0 | 114,503 | 520 | 5.0 |

U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Indicators of Comparative East-West Economic Strength, 1977
 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978)

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
 Military Balance: 1979-1980 (London: International Institute
 for Strategic Studies, 1979)

TABLE 5

1977 MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIERS, MARKET SHARES PERCENT

| | |
|-----------------------------|-------|
| United States | 39.2 |
| Soviet Union | 29.5 |
| France | 7.4 |
| Great Britain | 4.7 |
| Federal Republic of Germany | 4.5 |
| Czechoslovakia | 2.7 |
| All others | 12.0 |
| | 100.0 |

TABLE 6

SELECTED EUROPEAN CODEVELOPMENT AND COPRODUCTION PROJECTS

| <u>Countries</u> | <u>Projects</u> |
|---|---|
| 1) France and Great Britain | Puma Helicopter Lynx Helicopter Gazelle Helicopter Jaguar Tactical Support Aircraft Martel Air-Surface Missile Adour Jet Engine for Jaguar |
| 2) France and Federal Republic of Germany | Milan Anti-tank Missile Hot Anti-Tank Missile Roland Air-Defense Missile Transall C-160 CARGO Aircraft AlphaJet Advanced Training Aircraft |
| 3) Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy | Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) FH70 and SP70-155mm Howitzers RB 199 Engine for Tornado |
| 4) France and Italy | OTOMAT Anti-Ship Missile |
| 5) France and Belgium | Mirage F-1 Jet Interceptors |
| 6) France, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands Belgium | Atlantic Maritime Patrol Aircraft |

Table 5:

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1979), p. 18

Table 6:

U.S. Government Accounting Office, Trans-Atlantic Cooperation In Developing Weapons for NATO: A European Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General, 1979)

stability, large populations, and central location, the necessity of their involvement becomes even more apparent.

In addition, since we are considering the economic nature of defense as illustrated in arms development and procurement, these three nations would certainly be the cornerstone of any European armaments base. Following the United States and the Soviet Union, they are the largest arms exporters in the world. (Table 5) "Britain, France, and Germany have similar interests in economic and technological scale and motives. On the whole these differentiate them from smaller states..."¹

Another feature is that France and Great Britain possess Europe's only non-US nuclear force. The force de frappe of France is entirely controlled and developed nationally. At present the official French position is that this separation gives additional strength to the European deterrent by being separate from US control.² Great Britain has committed its nuclear force to NATO but the final decision for use still rests with the Prime Minister.

While the Federal Republic is forbidden by law and treaty from making atomic, biological or chemical weapons, it does possess the largest and most well-equipped conventional army in Central Europe. These conventional forces are interdeployed with other NATO forces and in accordance with West German Basic Law and by treaty do not have an independent General Staff and cannot take independent military action.³ The conventional forces of France and Britain are likewise large and well-trained (Table 4), but those of Great Britain are at present in need of extensive re-equipping. This is a problem which is presently being faced by the government of Prime Minister Thatcher.⁴ Together

these three nations account for nearly 75 percent of non-US NATO expenditures.⁵

Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands would be the outer-core of three nations next in importance for involvement in a European defense policy. As with the core nations, these three are members in the four organizations being considered. Statistically their forces and expenditures are moderately lower than those in the core. While Italy is closer in military levels to the core at the present than Belgium and the Netherlands, it is in the process of massive cutbacks.

Economically the three nations have a similar role in Western Europe. While Italy does have a larger GNP than Belgium or the Netherlands (Table 2), its per capita GNP and military expenditures and European trade role are similar or less than those of Belgium or the Netherlands (Tables 2-4).

Additionally, two of the three nations share a problem of governmental instability. Belgium has deepseated ethnic differences and Italy has the problem of weak coalition governments.

In spite of these drawbacks, the importance of these nations was recently highlighted in the decision to upgrade NATO's Theater Nuclear Force (TNF). While the majority of the new weapons will be located in Germany, the Federal Republic would not accept them unless other members would allow nuclear weapons on their territory. In addition to the Federal Republic and Britain, Italy and Belgium will have cruise missiles. The Netherlands will take two years to make a final decision on acceptance of the missiles and Belgium will re-evaluate its acceptance in mid-1980, but this initial acceptance was sufficient to allow the upgrading process to continue.⁶ In addition, the central location of

Belgium and the Netherlands and the Mediterranean location of Italy are of strategic importance to NATO.

While the first six nations mentioned were in their respective positions primarily because of what they have in common, the next nine nations are less influential for varied reasons, and so are considered on the periphery of policy influence.

Greece and Turkey make significant military efforts, but each is directed more against the other than in response to an outside threat (Table 4, Col. 4-5). While Greece will enter the EC on 1 January 1981, it has withdrawn from the military structure of NATO over its disagreements with Turkey. The primary importance of Turkey to Western Europe is its strategic location and role as a bridge between East and West.

Portugal is a member of NATO and the IEPC, but its small size and military efforts in addition to its location on the periphery of Europe would make it a useful but by no means decisive factor in Europe's defense policy-making.

Luxembourg's small size and miniscule military contribution makes it a minor factor in European defense. It belongs to all four organizations and, as shown, is tied economically to Belgium. While it is listed as being peripheral because of its size, it would undoubtedly follow the core nations in any effort they might make.

While the northern location of Denmark and Norway is strategically important to NATO, they have limited military resources and refuse to allow the stationing of foreign military forces on their soil.⁷ They did, however, refrain from vetoing the upgrading of NATO's TNF. These factors together with their small economic stature would preclude these

two nations from playing a major role.

While Iceland is a member of NATO it has no military forces of its own. It makes its contribution to European security through the use of its strategic location to monitor the northern passage from the Soviet Union.

Spain does not yet belong to any of the four organizations being considered, but it has applied to the EC for membership. It can be seen as being a de facto member of NATO because of the United States bases on its territory and the special treaty arrangements it has with the US.

The four remaining nations are considered external to the determination of European defense policy because of their chosen paths of neutrality. Of these four nations, Ireland is a member of the EC so any initial stages of unified arms procurement that might arise under the aegis of the EC would have to take it into consideration.

North America

The nature of the Atlantic Alliance is such that we must also consider the North American members of NATO, Canada and the United States, in our discussion. While Canada's role is limited to one brigade assigned to NATO, the US has six division equivalents located in the Federal Republic with three divisions committed to NATO as reinforcements.⁸

United States conventional forces make up only 10 percent of NATO's total, but they possess a large share of high technology items such as aircraft, anti-tank missiles, and tanks. Most importantly, the US supplies the bulk of the nuclear deterrent upon which the Alliance rests.⁹

A major problem area with the role of the United States is in its world-wide commitments. US activities are not always perceived by the West European nations as being in Europe's best interests. While we saw from the Rand Report in Chapter I that this does not signify a loss of Alliance solidarity, lack of European agreement is often perceived by American politicians as an unfriendly act. Many Americans do not perceive a difference between NATO interests and national or regional interests. This issue is a major point of disagreement between the US and its European Allies.

Economically, Western Europe is more important to the US as a customer than the US is to Western Europe. In 1978 the United States directed 27.5 percent of all its exports to Western Europe, but only 6.4 percent of Western Europe's exports went to the United States.¹⁰ The balance of military trade, known as the "two-way street problem," will be considered separately. Thus, while these are all factors to be considered in European cooperative efforts, there are numerous problem areas concerning the United States that will be discussed later.

The Role of Organizations

Numerous European and Atlantic organizations are regularly handling problems which have varying degrees of impact on national defense policies. As these organizations reach agreements in these different forums they are in effect approaching a more unified defense policy each step of the way.

Past attempts such as the European Defense Community have proven universally unsuccessful. However, there is now present a possible nucleus for further integration or cooperation in the defense field

through adaptation or a more full implementation of some already existing European organizations.

There are four organizations in Western Europe that must be examined for their present and possible roles in European defense policies. By nature of its supranational structures and economic background the European Communities (EC) must influence or play a role in any such development. As a strictly West European organization and the treaty holder of the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany's military, the Western European Union (WEU) is another institution to examine. As the foremost peacetime alliance in the world the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would seem to be a focal point of the entire issue. Finally, the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) and its eleven European members might play a major role in any resulting organization or process.

We will first examine the structure of these four organizations. Then we will examine the decision-making process within each of these organizations to see how it might be conducive to, or detrimental to, further European defense cooperation and a resulting European defense policy.

The European Communities

The EC is the uniting of the economies of nine countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. Legally there are three communities which share the same institutions; the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Through its institutions and

decision-making powers the EC is distinguished from traditional intergovernmental organizations. In its fields of common policies the institutions have legal status and internal powers.

The EC has a dual executive in the form of an independent Commission, which proposes and supervises the execution of laws, and a Council of Ministers representing each member state that enacts laws and programs based on Commission proposals.

As mentioned in Chapter I, the European Parliament is a directly elected body with only limited budgetary powers and no legislative powers. The Parliament cannot affect the nearly three-quarters of the budget which is committed to the CAP. What the Parliament can do is freeze the budget at the previous year's level if the Commission does not agree to make changes the Parliament desires.

Lastly, there is the Court of Justice which is the supreme court of the EC in that its decisions are final and cannot be appealed in national courts. Decisions are binding on member nations, corporations, or individuals involved in the scope of the application of the Treaty of Rome.

Western European Union

The Western European Union (WEU) is a consultative intergovernmental organization made up of a council and a secretariat. Its present membership is Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic, and Italy. It originally possessed a military structure, but that was passed over to NATO as part of the Paris Protocols in 1954. Its present importance lies in the fact that it is the organization to which Britain promised to maintain forces on the continent and the organization which controls the size and capabilities

of the Federal Republic's military.¹² Also, the Brussels Treaty which developed into the WEU pledged each member to militarily support and other member who is attacked. The corresponding article of the North Atlantic Treaty only says that:

The Parties...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (emphasis added)¹³

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The treaty from which NATO is derived has a dual significance: the importance of the economic and social sectors and a cooperative security system to further each nation's defensive abilities. An important point is that as a collective defense organization, decisions are made unanimously.

NATO has a civil and military structure with the North Atlantic Council being the highest level of authority for both. Under the civil structure there is the Secretary General with an international staff and an extensive committee system dealing with political, military, and economic affairs. A major factor of the military structure is that there are standing, international forces under the NATO commands. For example there is the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force for use as a reaction force and the multinational destroyer force known as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. Factors such as these clearly separate the NATO from previous defense treaties which only took on substance following an outbreak of hostilities.¹⁴

An increasingly influential part of NATO is the Eurogroup, an informal sub-group whose aim is "to strengthen Alliance security by

seeking to ensure that the European contribution to the common defense is as strong and cohesive as possible."¹⁵ The members of this group are Belgium, Britain, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Norway, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Obviously the lack of French participation is a major problem but that will be examined in the next section. The Eurogroup defense ministers usually meet just prior to NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC) meeting to assess the current status of Eurogroup political and practical efforts. The regular representatives are each nation's permanent representatives to NATO, supplemented with a coordinating committee and a secretariat. Seven sub-groups have been set up to deal with particular problems: equipment collaboration (EURONAD), common development and harmonization of operational concepts (EUROLONG-TERM), communication (EUROCOM), medical support (EUROMED), logistics (EUROLOG), training (EURO/NATOTRAINING), and force structures (EUROSTRUCTURE).¹⁶

The first major act by the Eurogroup was the European Defense Improvement program (EDIP) in 1970 where \$1 billion (1970 prices) was planned to be used for common alliance needs. Following the completion of that project most of their efforts have gone into the NATO Long Term Development Program (LTDP).¹⁷

The LTDP was adopted at the Heads of State and Government meeting held in Washington on 30 and 31 May 1978. This program is to help the NATO collective defense "and provides for force improvements in certain selected areas and for a greater degree of Alliance cooperation, leading to an increase in overall defensive capability to reinforce those forces."¹⁸ Efforts are to be made to improve NATO capabilities in certain important

area: readiness, reinforcement, reserve mobilization, maritime posture, air defense, communications, command and control, electronic warfare, logistics, rationalization, and theatre nuclear forces.

Independent European Program Group

The Independent European Program Group (IEPG) has been called one of the most significant European institutions for defense cooperation.¹⁹ It was formed in 1975 by the Eurogroup Defense Ministers as a new forum to enable France to play a full role in European arms procurement and defense matters away from the context of a NATO organization.

The main work of the IEPG is divided into three panels. The first is concerned with equipment, planning, and anticipating obsolescence and future needs. Panel two coordinates ten sub-groups which are investigating specific opportunities for cooperation. Panel three is the Defense Economics and Procedures Panel which is working to avoid duplication of development efforts.²⁰

While the IEPG has not yet been involved in a major enough decision to judge its effectiveness, it holds the most potential of all the organizations mentioned. By being separate from NATO and having an all-European membership it can work to develop European interests. With the overlap of the Eurogroup membership, this European interest can be developed to more fully fit into the Atlantic defense context.

Organizational Problems

The four organizations discussed so far each have a different purpose and very different structures. Alone, none of them has the ability to expand into such a difficult area as defense policy in an

efficient manner, but among them all the prerequisites for a cooperative system would seem to be present. There is NATO with its standing military and civilian structure, WEU and its strong treaty obligations it holds, the IEPG and its large European membership and the EC with its existing economic structure and organizational capabilities. Knowing the basic structure for each organization we will now examine each with an eye for the particular strengths or weaknesses of the organizations as they relate to the problems of a European defense policy.

European Communities

In the modern world, part of a nation's defense is its economic power and in Western Europe portions of the economic power are held by the EC. When the EC extends credit, sells advanced technology and food, and co-develops natural resources of East European nations, it is aiding countries the member states have previously identified as potential adversaries. Therefore, actions taken in conjunction with these countries should be planned and organized in such a manner as not to be detrimental to their own defense posture. A good summation of this problem is made in the book, Decision Making in the European Community:

It must further be noted that the problems associated with economic integration are becoming increasingly linked with others regarding which the member states are obliged to collaborate, namely problems in the fields of political cooperation, defense, science, technology etc.²¹

Even prior to the recent direct elections the European Parliament was beginning to be a force to be considered. It had begun to take

on some controversial issues and attempted to force the Commission to take action on them. In December 1976 the Political Committee of the European Parliament made a motion for European armaments cooperation as the forerunner of a Common Industrial Policy. It was sent to research and emerged in May 1978 as the Klepsch Report on European Armaments Procurement Cooperation.²² It is significant in that it examines all the organizations we have examined here and more. Based on economic and industrial necessity the report then shows how the EC could set up a European Armaments Procurement Agency (EAPA). We will return to this EAPA later, but the point now is that the European Parliament may become more of an impetus to Community action, especially since it is now directly elected. Through its actions it may loosen the rigidity of the Commission's bureaucracy and play conscience or devil's advocate to the Council and the European summit. Carried too far, its efforts could prove detrimental, but in its first few months the new Parliament seems to be moving forward.

Another positive factor in matters of the economics of defense policy is the fact that the EC is well equipped to handle the initial problems. For the most part the Commission has been kept from this grey area of defense/economic matters by those who claim that it is totally out of the realm and jurisdiction of the EC. However, the preamble to the treaties establishing the EC declares in part, "Resolved by this pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty..." (emphasis added)²³ This call in conjunction with the economic nature of so many defense issues would seem to give the EC the right and the need to step into this area. Any new powers needed could be adopted under article 235

which provides expansion of powers when deemed necessary.²⁴

Western European Union

The only real issue the WEU has been addressing in recent years has been the study of the military capabilities of organization members. While useful, this does not seem to be the major forum of a potential European defense policy-maker. It does have a Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) to deal with weapons procurement, but since its establishment in 1955, it has managed to accomplish very little. With the advent of the Eurogroup and the IEPG there is no one who expects anything to come of the organization in its present form.

As mentioned earlier, the WEU is of importance because of its strong treaty obligations and its control of the Federal Republic's military--two powers that would need to be transferred to any new organization that was to coordinate overall European defense policy and not just the economic portions discussed primarily so far. Until such a transfer can occur, the WEU will have a role to play.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The wide membership of NATO makes for its minimal usefulness as a direct factor in a European defense policy-making process. In particular, US and Canadian membership and that of countries such as Greece and Turkey negates any use of the organization itself as the center of European policy coordination.

In his book, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, Peyton V. Lyon claims that NATO's greatest political role is as a forum away from the public spotlight to discuss political crises, to act as a clearing house for

information and to foster consultation.²⁵ This role can be important in and of itself by supplying the forum for dialogue between the European members of NATO and the North American members. But in order for it to be effective as a forum, the European members must be capable of speaking in a more united voice. While it is still a developing organization, the Eurogroup seems desirous of filling that role within NATO. The European members of NATO supply 75 percent of the Alliance's aircraft and 90 percent of the land forces.²⁶ It is only the nuclear capability of the US which continues to give it the dominant role in the organization.

The US nuclear deterrent and the forum of NATO can prove complementary to one another if the Europeans take advantage of them. The American presence gives the Allies protection while they work to develop an overall European defense policy within the framework of the Alliance. In addition, the large conventional forces possessed by the European members of the Alliance show the substantial market they would have among themselves if they were to develop a common arms policy early on.

Independent European Program Group

With the development of the IEPG the Eurogroup has changed its role somewhat. Rather than be the forum for development of a European defense program, it will more likely serve as the European spokesman in the Alliance while the IEPG supplies the forum.

The informality of the IEPG's structure is one of its greatest advantages. As opposed to the bureaucracy and structure of the EC, it has only a loose organization to look at different problems. This

gives it the capability to develop along lines which may prove useful and also means that it is not yet committed to a particular type of operation.

Summary

What we have seen so far is a dual role played by the organizations and nations of Western Europe. Nations such as France are crucial if continued European defense cooperation is to develop, yet it remains apart from NATO's military structure. On the other hand nations such as Greece and Turkey or Denmark and Norway are strategically important for the defense of Europe, yet distinct from Central Europe in enough ways to lessen their direct influence on increased defense cooperation.

In other words, while each member of NATO has its own importance and role, the contributions are not equal. Any attempt at cooperation without the inner-core nations would have little chance at success. Once the inner-core is in agreement it is more likely the outer-core nations would join in. Once these nations join, a mutually beneficial relationship could be developed between the core nations and those of the periphery. The core nations hold economic and industrial importance for those of the periphery; the periphery holds great strategic importance for those of the core. To put this relationship in perspective, the inner- and outer-core nations, plus Denmark and Luxembourg in the periphery and Ireland as an external nation are EC members and so their chief executives make up the European Council. Discussion on major economic and defense related issues might well take place during their summit meetings and so the critical bloc of West European nations would be working together.

The organizations under discussion seem to have the same dual nature. When all organizations are considered, there is high-level political cooperation (EPC), military consultation and commitment (NATO and WEU), economic structure and expertise (EEC), and military industrial cooperation (IEPG). Unfortunately, the fact that they are organizations of different membership, structure, and authority impedes additional development. These impediments, both national and structural, will be examined next.

Roots of Dissension

We have seen numerous reasons for some degree of European defense cooperation and have examined the nations in the region for their involvement in such policy formulation. However, there are numerous problems within Europe and the Atlantic system which make any greater defense cooperation difficult. Generally these are either a specific national problem or they are a general economic or military problem of the system. Therefore, it is in these two divisions that we will examine the problems.

National Priorities

Fortunately the decline of Britain's military role in Europe seems to have stopped. Great Britain seems to have reached a mid-point following its decline from its claim of superpower status as a victor of the Second World War to nearly becoming a third-rate military power following defense spending cutbacks by the Labor government in 1975.²⁷ While Britain's security is largely dependent upon NATO through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), it does have varying numbers of forces

involved in Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, Cyprus, Belize, the Falkland Islands, Diego Garcia, Brunei, and Hong Kong.

As mentioned earlier, the British nuclear force is committed to NATO. However, the present British nuclear force is becoming obsolete. The Conservative government of 1979 has decided to upgrade Britain's nuclear deterrent although the exact manner has not yet been decided.

The dichotomy of France's role is one of the major problem areas of European defense. It is one of the major countries of Western Europe and yet at the same time it chooses not to be involved in cooperative efforts in which it cannot maintain a firm control.

The strength of the Gaullists and the Left-wing parties are enough to insure that it remains outside NATO's military structure and keeps on its separate path. France's insistence on a separately developed nuclear force means that it must spend significantly more money on defense. With much of France's conventional forces presently due for replacement in the near future, it remains to be seen if France can maintain its present level of military sophistication.

While France is no longer a colonial power, it still feels required to aid its former colonies if called upon. As with Britain, this is another factor which needs to be considered in defense matters.

While the Federal Republic is firmly committed to defense cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance, the fact that it remains a divided nation must always be taken into account. The official policy of the Federal Republic is still to work towards a goal of German unity. "The Federal Republic of Germany continues to pursue her declared intention of working for a state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain their unity in free self-determination."²⁸

Legally, however, its special situation should not present any major problems to further defense cooperation. Its military is already committed to the NATO command at the outbreak of hostilities by its treaty of accession to the WEU. Economically, its trade with the German Democratic Republic is considered internal trade by special arrangement with the EC.

In Italy, the disagreement among political parties and the influence of the Italian Communist Party has led to governmental instability. Added to this, Italy's economic problems have led to what the Italian government calls a reorganization of their military force structure. What it actually amounts to is the reduction of their armed forces to a more affordable level.²⁹

Like France, Greece has withdrawn from the military structure of NATO over the Greek-Turkish crisis about Cyprus and control over the Aegean. While there are presently efforts underway within NATO to negotiate the return of Greece to the military structure, no decision is likely prior to some sort of accommodation with Turkey.

In Turkey, the problem with Greece and its own political instability and economic deterioration have put a major strain on NATO. Turkey has even attempted to utilize article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty which says, "The Parties will...seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."³⁰ These efforts by then Prime Minister Ecevit did aid in the receipt of an aid loan from the OECD.

While Greece and Turkey each have large military forces, their expenditures per person is at a very low level. In addition, the

equipment used by them is the type which was discarded by most of the Western Allies in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Putting the political, economic, and military problems of Greece, Turkey, and Italy along with their geographic inaccessibility together with the fact that they make up the entire Southern flank of NATO, they present a major strategic problem for the Alliance.

On the Northern flank of NATO, Denmark is displaying another weakness of the Alliance. Denmark is refusing to try and improve its defense budget by 3 percent in real terms. If its present defense budget is followed, it will be forced to reduce its army by 20,000 men, the number of combat aircraft from 116 to 80, and the navy would lose a third of its ships.³¹

Ireland's neutrality and its membership in the EC is another issue that would need to be addressed if some manner of European defense policy is ever to be achieved. The veto each EC member has on politically related matters might enable Ireland to effectively tie up any defense cooperation that might begin to develop under the auspices of the EC.

The Present Framework

The fourteen armed members of NATO have a combined GNP nearly three times that of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time NATO is out-spending the Warsaw Pact on conventional forces. However, NATO only spends 4.5 percent of its GNP on defense while the Warsaw Pact spends 11.7 percent. The NATO expenditures are made on the basis of fourteen different perceptions of national defense requirements, and are often based on political or economic grounds rather than on military necessity.³² It is not surprising that the conventional forces imbalance

continues to widen. The entire process of arms procurement, from deciding what equipment is needed, to the training on and maintenance of the end product is beset with conflicts of interests among the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

What has developed among most Western nations is a new orientation of government. In a book by Werner Link and Werner Feld, The New Nationalism, this new orientation is described as a situation where:

...distributive matters have become more important than non-distributive ones; welfare and economic issues have become more important than the issue of defense. The New Nationalism has its roots in the rising expectation of well-being in the Western states.³³

In the same book Wolfram F. Hanrieder describes the system which makes up this "New Nationalism" as:

...an interconnected flow of national (vertical); international (horizontal); transnational (lateral); and supranational (integrative) forces: a complex of relationships which is usually described as interdependence, in which demands are articulated and processed through institutional as well as informal channels.³⁴

What results from this system is a mixture of differing defense needs, military and industrial capabilities, and questions of national sovereignty and control.

Therefore, we will now evaluate the subject of arms procurement and examine the efforts and problems at each level.

NATO Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI)

NATO RSI is a popular phrase used by politicians and military men alike to describe the overall process of arms cooperation. RSI can be taken to mean anything from the unity of tactical concepts, to the adoption of standardized policies or weapons systems, to ensuring

that similar systems within the Alliance are usable in conjunction with those of an ally. A brief definition given by US Army Chief of Staff, General E.C. Meyer was that:

...rationalization is the agreement upon the way you're going to go about the fighting. Standardization is the equipment that fits into it. Interoperability is what you do in the units on a day to day basis, working one with another.³⁵

However, when it comes to specifically stating what is involved in this phrase, each interpretation differs. When the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness addressed this issue in 1977 hearings, this was a fundamental problem with which they were confronted. Their determination was that RSI is:

...used to describe undefined concepts. It is simultaneously a philosophy, a policy, and a practice, a military objective and a political mechanism and a macro-economic device...(It) became apparent (in the hearings) that RSI has so many potential meanings and that, in effect, it is a meaningless terms.³⁶

Unfortunately, since there is no agreement on what the term means, there is no agreement on how to proceed. The NATO phrase for RSI is simply "Alliance Cooperation," and each member decides what that means.³⁷

A view of what this discord means was given at a speech by US Undersecretary of Defense for NATO Affairs, Robert W. Kromer, at the 1979 meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association. He said that:

...When one reflects that coalition warfare - alliance versus alliance instead of nation versus nation - is more the norm than the exception in the history of conflict, it baffles me that we have never evolved a coherent doctrine for coalition war. We still plan, configure, size, train and equip our forces nationally, as if each of us were going to fight the common enemy alone.³⁸

There are several ways in which countries procure armaments. They can develop and produce their own system, let someone else develop a

system and then co-produce it under a license agreement, but someone else's system, or jointly develop a system and share in the production.

Ideally, each country prefers to produce its own system. This does nothing for the collective defense of NATO, but does appeal to the individual nation. However, the increasingly prohibitive costs of research, development, and production are signalling an end to this process. Within NATO only the United States can afford to equip its military in nationally developed equipment.

As mentioned earlier, the Federal Republic, France, and Great Britain have the major armament bases in Western Europe, yet even they find it best to utilize the joint development and production. Table 6 shows that these three nations have been most involved in codevelopment. Efforts at trans-Atlantic codevelopment such as the German-American Main Battle Tank 70 project or the United States involvement in the European FH70 155 mm howitzer development have proven unsuccessful. The United States tends to impose stricter requirements and tests on its equipment because of world-wide commitments. Since these requirements raise the cost, the European nations are not interested in their adoption.

The co-production of US F-16 aircraft by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway was a major licensing agreement. For its part, the United States is preparing to produce under license its version of the French-German Roland air defense missile system. A major example of "off the shelf" purchases is the Federal Republic's Leopard I tank being in service with the Federal Republic, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway.³⁹

The focal point of the problem becomes the different views of what each nation hopes to achieve through equipment RSI. The United States declares that it seeks to increase defense cooperation for the military benefits the Alliance will achieve. With the present dominance of the United States arms market in Europe, this claim is easily made without worries of the economic effects which might result from defense cooperation. NATO's European members see RSI as an economic process of supporting their defense establishments and their overall industry while trying to get the best equipment possible for the money involved.⁴⁰

For its part, the United States has voiced strong support for NATO RSI through both the President and the Congress. During the 1978 NATO Head of State meeting President Carter pledged the US to establishing an effective "two-way street" in arms cooperation. The US Congress has been much more specific. The Culver-Nunn Amendment to the 1977 Department of Defense Authorization Act states the United States policy and the wish of Congress:

It is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe...should be standardized or at least interoperable with the equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁴¹

The Act also allows the Secretary of Defense to waive provisions of the "Buy American" act when necessary to procure standardized or interoperable equipment. Any equipment procured that is not standard or interoperable with NATO must be reported to Congress and explained. However, good intentions and US industry do not go together.

The Act also calls upon the Secretary of Defense to open a dialogue with other Alliance members to further cooperative efforts. An appeal is

also directed to the European nations:

It is the sense of the Congress that standardization of weapons and equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance on the basis of a "Two-way Street" concept of cooperation in defense procurement between Europe and North America could only work in a realistic sense if the European nations operated in a united and collective basis.⁴²

This collective voice called for by the US Congress is still lacking, but efforts by the IEPC could begin to unify them. Due primarily to the system of interdependence described earlier by Wolfram Hanrieder on page 50 as the "New Nationalism," there are several major impediments to trans-Atlantic cooperation. A United States Government Accounting Office report found that:

(The) principal impediments Europeans see are--Concern that the United States, because of its size, will tend to dominate in a joint venture, relegating Europe to a junior partner status;---US arms exports policies which they feel tend to restrict third country sales;---Government restrictions on technology transfer which impede or block the free flow of US technology to Europe; and doubt as to whether the United States would be willing to compromise on some of its weapons system acquisition practices.⁴³

A major issue under the first point is what has been referred to as the "Two-Way Street." In general terms this is a concept of equal sales and purchases of arms from each side of the Atlantic. Looking at the 1977 arms trade between the United States and NATO Europe in current dollars, the US had sales of 1.1831 billion dollars to purchases of 124.6 million dollars for a favorable balance of 9.5:1. However, if all military and defense related goods and services are added, it then becomes sales of 1.329 billion to purchases of 2.687 billion on a 1:2 ration. However, the European view is to exclude directly related goods and services except when to their advantage.⁴⁴

An example of this was in the arrangement made between the United

States and the Federal Republic. In exchange for the Federal Republic's participation in the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS), the US agreed to adopt the German 120 mm tank gun for the US XM1 tank; purchased German equipment and labor for a new US-European telephone system; and German non-tactical utility vehicles. Though two-thirds of this deal was obviously not armaments, the linkage of the issues was obvious in a statement by the Bundestag Defense Affairs Committee:

The Defense Affairs Committee also assumes that the NATO-E-3A Project (AWACS) will mark the beginning of the two-way street with the USA. This presupposes an unrestricted fulfillment of the compensation which has been promised by the USA and which is contained in the text through the license agreement for the 120 mm tank gun, the purchase of German telephone equipment, and the purchase of German non-tactical vehicles.⁴⁵

The Commission of the EC is also beginning to enter into this problem area. It has decided that the EEC customs duty applies to weapons purchased from outside the Nine. The EEC Industry Commissioner, Viscount Davignon, is presently trying to collect customs on the \$2 billion purchase of F-16 fighters by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. He is also trying to collect duties on Belgium's purchase of over 1,000 American armored vehicles. The Economist reported that, "Viscount Davignon reckons that the levying of EEC duties would help to establish a more realistic two-way traffic between the Community and the United States in arms sales."⁴⁶ How duties would have that effect, they do not say.

Related to this is the issue of the US arms export policy. As mentioned earlier, France, Britain, and the Federal Republic are major arms exporters. Third-party sales are the only way most European countries can economically produce their own version of a system. If

the system has restrictions such as those usually placed by the United States on those using its technology, the system is no longer financially viable for them.

The issue of technology transfer is one of the major inducements to trans-Atlantic cooperation. This was a major point in the sale of F-16 aircraft. While some claims are being made that technology is being held back, the spin-off of technology from this project to military and civil industries in the nations concerned is well-documented.⁴⁷

The final issue of US procurement procedural problems has already been substantially addressed by the Culver-Nunn Amendment. One problem that still remains is in the decision making process to adopt a particular system. The United States procedure is to have a competition of prototypes among competing firms. Since most European nations can only support one firm in each field, the cost of competition such as that required by the United States is prohibitive. Therefore, competition on equal terms with US firms is usually not a practical process.

The net effect of all these trans-Atlantic problems is the create dissension among the European Alliance members. The size of US industry is such that when the smaller European nations need new equipment, it is often cheaper to purchase from the US than from a European producer. The big loser in the F-16 sale and the Belgium purchase of American armored vehicles was France. The size of the F-16 sale was such that it prompted France's desire to enter the IEPG and become more involved in cooperative efforts. The policy now being espoused by France is that a direct preference for European systems must be adopted at the expense of US imports. The fact that France might gain the most from such a system has not been lost on its allies.

Summary

We have seen that in the development of defense cooperation, problems seem to be centered first on national problems and then on the very structure of cooperative efforts.

Many of the nations of Europe have problems which influence them such as the overseas commitments of Britain and France and the division of the Federal Republic of Germany. The outer-core nations have political problems while those of the periphery have substantial political, economic, and military problems.

The competition from the United States armaments industry to that of West European nations is also a problem along with the world-wide role of United States activities which often run counter to the West European nations' best interests.

These national problems in conjunction with the increased interdependence and rising expectations of the West make a European voice in defense matters difficult to attain. The present framework of defense cooperation has shown much potential in recent cooperative efforts, but in it also inhere the problems outlined.

In the final chapter we shall discuss how contemporary integration theory applies to these efforts and then propose how these efforts might be coordinated to become the foundation of a European defense policy.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

VIEW OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

We have examined the development of European organizations and the forces which brought them about. We have also analyzed the roles and involvement of nations in the arms procurement policies of the Atlantic Alliance as a prelude to a European defense policy. Now we shall examine our hypothesis of arms procurement as an inducement to defense policy making from the perspective of basic integration theory. Finally we will examine the substantive suggestions which have been made concerning European security and their applicability to the formation of a European defense policy. This should then define the prospects for the evolution of a European defense policy in the foreseeable future.

Integration and Defense

With the development, first of the ECSC and then the EC, the theory of political integration began to be developed and extensively discussed, with the hope that these theories would adequately explain the success or failures of integration in Europe. R.J. Harrison, in his book Europe in Question,¹ discusses the varied theories of integration and eventually divides them into three groups. The first approach is called functionalism, commonly espoused by David Mitrany.² Functionalism is a non-political process which seeks to avoid conflict by concentrating on common needs among nations. The sectors to be coordinated are chosen very specifically

and organized separately with no coordination among them.

The premises are those of a very simple utilitarianism, in which the calculation of welfare interest is the ultimate determinant of behaviorism, and a harmony of interests may be contrived.³

In other words, it is an attempt to link authority in a region on the basis of function and in doing so break the link between authority and a specific national area. But there is no corresponding replacement of national authority by any integrated authority which coordinates the different integrated sectors.

Second, there is the federalist approach which according to Harrison,

...has two fairly constant elements. It is conceived as a method of obtaining political union among separate states. It is also seen as a form of government with certain advantages and disadvantages over the unitary system.⁴

This approach is supposed to preserve diversity while creating unity.

This system is that mentioned earlier as being favored by Charles DeGaulle for the future of European integration.

The alternative to these two is the system which best describes the process of arms cooperation that we have examined. This is known as the federal functionalist approach, or neo-functionalism whose proponents argue that when certain common sectors of sovereign states are brought under joint control, they may become integrated because of the involvement of special interests of the different nations.⁵

A key difference between functionalism and neo-functionalism is in their overall process. Whereas in functionalism separate fields are independently integrated, in neo-functionalism the key is in the total effect of the integrated sectors. These fields should be inherently expansive and as these sectors are brought under joint control the power

of the new central authority should be greater than the sum of the individual sectors. The sectors must be important and controversial enough to maintain interest, but they should not cross into the area of a nation's vital interests.⁶

It is the contention of this study that as military and economic special interests see advantages in trans-national cooperation, pressure is placed on the political actors to take integrative steps to placate these special interests. In order to come to a position where these different national interests can have common efforts and common definitions, aims and goals need to be determined.

Within NATO, the sub-groups of the Eurogroup are attempting to develop a European view on major defense issues.⁷ Once these are determined the way would be open for additional cooperation among the European states in potentially integrative areas. Europe would then be able to negotiate with the United States on more of a basis of equality.

While European nations criticize the lack of agreement on requirements in a weapon system between the United States and Europe such as in the US/FRG MBT 70 project, the problem is just as prevalent within Europe. Prior to the Federal Republic's development of the Leopard II tank, the Federal Republic and Great Britain tried unsuccessfully to agree on the requirements for a tank to be codeveloped.⁸ If the Eurogroup sub-section Euro-longterm would be able to harmonize European needs and requirements, the way would then be cleared for greater European collaboration and greater European influence within NATO's Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and in relations with the United States.

A critic of the theory of neo-functionalism, Stanley Hoffman, draws a distinction between "high" and "low" politics and between negative and positive forms of integration.⁹ The present nature of economic integration has been negative in that it was in actuality only a removal of restrictions on economic issues to allow for the attainment of common ground in non-critical or "low" politics areas. Unified planning in such "high" politics areas as defense are seen as requiring positive actions or planning on the part of states and will therefore be much less likely to come about.¹⁰ However, what we have examined so far are numerous efforts to simply reduce discord in defense-related matters to allow for harmonization in economic and military related areas. This process is closer to that of Hoffman's negative integration and therefore easier to attain. On the other hand, even if one were to conceptualize these efforts as "high" politics requiring positive actions, their successful attainment would not be impossible. One of our efforts has been to show the enormous pressures being exerted to bring about this cooperation.

While this does by no means constitute a detailed examination of integration theory and contemporary Western Europe, it does illustrate that the present efforts at defense and related cooperation can be explained by one of the accepted theoretical frameworks.

Cooperative Models

Contemporary journals and books contain a myriad of suggestions for a European defense policy from basic to elaborate, from conservative efforts to radical changes. To keep the discussion manageable, we will restrict the views considered here to those of the United States, the EC, and two analysts of European defense. Then we shall look at these

suggestions in light of the framework of chapter two and see if they make up a workable system. Finally we will specify the environment and structure that would be necessary for a unified defense policy to evolve in the European setting.

The United States

The United States has begun to call for a "Family of Weapons" concept of arms production within the Atlantic Alliance. This is still quite vague but what it generally entails is the split up of weapons development within a weapons type. For example, in surface-to-air missiles, the United States might develop a long range missile for the Alliance, Europe would develop the short range missile. Each would then make its development openly available to the other. In this manner duplicative R&D can be eliminated and standardization of equipment can be achieved.¹¹

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs, Dr. Ellen Frost, carried this idea a step further in testimony before the House Armed Services NATO Standardizations Subcommittee when she stated that,

I think what we are aiming at in the "Family of Weapons" concept is a NATO wide market consisting of a much more meshed and intermingled sense of R&D and production activities on both sides so that it won't become a question of simple purchases of European equipment or a simple purchase of US equipment, although that will undoubtedly continue.¹²

Dr. Frost developed this idea further in a paper entitled, NATO RSI: Towards a Common Defense Market, now circulating in the Pentagon and US defense industry circles.¹³ In brief, what is called for is a, "market that affords opportunities for procurement, (co)production,

and (co)development on a multi-national and preferably competitive basis."¹⁴

However, before any such far-reaching plan could hope to come into effect, European nations would need to attain what the US Congress has called for: the ability to speak in a unified voice. A truly Atlantic view on defense matters would only be possible following such a development. But because of the size of the United States, the presence of its nuclear deterrents, and the fear many European nations have of being dominated, there is no chance for a European voice to develop in a forum which includes the United States. For the same reason, the fledgling idea in the United States of a common defense market could only be developed following the attainment of a European policy. For the United States to continue to build upon its present policy of bilateral memorandums of understanding can only lead to increased dissension among the European nations.

Western Europe

Efforts at general foreign policy cooperation such as the Fouchet Plan or the Davignon Report have already been mentioned. They addressed defense as one area of a unified foreign policy. The EC Commission published a Report on European Union for the Council in 1975 which presented the general needs of a political union and some different models as to how this union might be developed.¹⁵

The one page, paragraphs 74-81, which is given to defense in this report, makes some major points. It reaffirms that the Atlantic Alliance is still the key to Western defense, and that European solidarity can

only aid this issue:

The Atlantic Alliance plays and will continue to play a decisive role in the security of Western Europe, but the security of the Union, its long term cohesion and solidarity between its peoples cannot be truly guaranteed if defence matters are purely and simply left on one side when the Union is being established.¹⁶

More specifically, paragraphs 80 and 81 suggest arriving at this point by striving to reach a common European view of strategic planning to be followed by the establishment of a "European Arms Agency" to make a more rational use of funds, industry, and technology among all the member states while aiding non-military industries.¹⁷

Most interesting for our discussion is paragraph 79 which I quote in its entirety:

79. Alignment of the Member States' defence policies could be desirable even outside the framework of the Treaty of Union and might even facilitate the creation of the Union. Among the actions which could be the first tangible signs of such an alignment could be periodic discussions on defence problems and the defence effort held in a truly European framework with the participation of all Member States.¹⁸

The first sentence illustrates the opinion of the Commission that defense cooperation could be a positive influence on the integration process rather than a hindrance to it.

Later that same year another report was submitted to the Council entitle The European Union, now usually called the Tindemanns Report after its rapporteur Mr. Leo Tindemanns, then Prime Minister of Belgium.¹⁹ This report also specifically addressed the security issues with some concrete proposals.

The report proposed the regular exchange of views on defense matters, cooperation in the manufacture of armaments, and continuing political cooperation concerning detente. Most significant was its proposal that

the European "...Parliament should be able, from now on, to consider all questions, within the competence of the Union, whether or not they are covered by the Treaties."²⁰ The significance of the Parliament's involvement in the defense area will be discussed later.

In May 1978 the European Parliament drew up a Report on European Armaments Procurement Cooperation, now known as the Klepsch Report.²¹

According to the committee,

...the real starting point of the present report and the accompanying draft resolution lies in the need for an initiative to be taken to remedy the Community's continuing failure to take action in developing a common industrial policy.²²

The report's detailed examination of the industrial and military aspects of arms development illustrates the interrelationship of defense matters to matters of the EC.

The Klepsch Report's primary conclusion was,

...to call upon the Commission to make proposals for the creation of a single, structured Community market in military equipment which would, taking into account the civilian aspects of the industries concerned, constitute a major element, or 'building block', in the development of an overall common industrial policy.²³

To accomplish this the IEPG would acquire a permanent secretariat and become the European Armaments Procurement Agency (EAPA). The Commission and/or the Council would then represent the EC within the IEPG which would in turn coordinate individual projects. The IEPG, or EAPA as it would have become, would then represent Europe in discussions of the "two-way street" with the United States. With the IEPG acting in a separate manner from the EC, the neutrality of Ireland could be accommodated by its determination of the nature of its own participation.

Independent Views

A European security expert, Dr. Lothar Rühl, addressed this same issue in his book, The Nine and NATO.²⁴ While NATO and United States protection continue to function, he sees no need for the development of a European defense structure. Rühl asserts that improved cooperation in defense and armaments matters is all that is presently needed. Dr. Rühl does say that if the United States were to withdraw from Europe, a massive effort would be necessary to develop a credible European defense system.

Dr. Rühl rejects the notion of any formal linkage between NATO and the EC, but does recognize the interrelationship between the organizations in spite of their different roles and membership:

It (the EC) must recognize the supreme importance of the American strategic presence in Europe and the necessary leadership of the United States as the predominant global power of the Western Alliance. Its own security and defense policies can therefore only be a function of this wider alliance and of the American strategic cover. European independence cannot, therefore, be defined against the United States but within the broader framework of an Alliance system that is flexible and liberal enough to adjust to the often diverging aspirations of its members.²⁵

In contradiction to the opinion of Dr. Rühl is that of Sir Bernard Burrows in an article entitled European Security.²⁶ Burrows examines in great detail the problems of the NATO Alliance with the conclusion that some sort of West European defense system needs to be set up by a decision of the governments involved. In Burrows' view, this decision should be to establish a European Community framework to "meet the institutional requirements of European defence cooperation."²⁷ While this new organization would utilize the organizations we have discussed, they would merely be adjuncts to the EC framework. Burrows passes over

the problems inherent in the EC assuming such a military role and in doing so presents a major problem of his suggestions.

The EDC and Existing Structures

While each of the above mentioned reports goes into great detail in its particular areas, the main point is that there is no shortage of options available to the nations of Western Europe.

The most detailed plan for European defense yet developed was the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). It is still perceived as a plan which was too extensive and remains unacceptable to the nations involved. The structure of the EDC mirrored that of the ECSC. In fact it shared the same assembly, now the European Parliament, and court. (Figure 1) Its Council was to be made up of national ministers who set policy guidelines. On important issues a unanimous vote would be required.

The Commissariat of the EDC was to be a separate body which made decisions on military-related economic and financial matters. It was also to oversee the structure and training of the EDC military forces. Militarily, the national divisions were to be grouped into EDC Corps. Only forces committed to the NATO defense were to be under the EDC. Those forces to be used outside the NATO region were to remain under the individual nation's controls.²⁸

Equivalent organizations to what was called for under the EDC are already in existence. The European Council of the EC is now discussing topics outside the Treaty of Rome and is attempting to reach common positions. The process of European Political Cooperation has already

FIGURE I

EDC Proposals

Council of National Ministers

Commissariat

ECSC Assembly

ESCS Court

National Divisions within EDC
Corps

Required commitment to aid in
mutual defense

Existing Structures

European Council

European Political Cooperation

(IEPG) (EUROGROUP)

-Working groups only

European Parliament

European Court of Justice

Existing multinational Corps
US/FRG, DK/FRG
Regular joint multinational
exercises

Treaty obligations of WEU

led to common views on issues such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Palestinian issue, and relations with Africa.²⁹

While there is no direct equivalent to the EDC Commissariat, its functions are predominantly subsumed under the Eurogroup and the IEPG. The difference, of course, is the specific powers intended for the Commissariat while the IEPG and the Eurogroup continue to be only joint working groups.

With regard to multinational corps, there is already a joint United States-Federal Republic corps in Southern Germany and a Denmark-Federal Republic corps on their respective border.³⁰ Additionally, during the term of General Alexander Haig as SACEUR, extensive multinational exercises became regular occurrences.

Thus, we have seen that there is a major problem in the lack of defense cooperation, and we have also seen that solutions are present and accessible. They lack only coordination and a common purpose. Defense cooperation would not have to wait for a Federal European State or a European Union. Therefore, we must see what is needed.

The Coordinated Response

Certain actions could be taken on both sides of the Atlantic to further European defense cooperation through arms procurement. First, all nations concerned would have to agree on the subjects to be discussed, and NATO would have to develop beyond "Allied Cooperation." Once all agree on what RSI means, then the next step would have to be the formation of a single European voice on matters of the "two-way street" and arms production.

The United States could take four kinds of actions with regard to Europe. First, the United States should continue to urge and tactfully pressure the European nations to cooperate and present a unified front on NATO matters. It would be preferable for the United States to have an equal European partner in NATO rather than fourteen junior partners.

Second, the United States should continue to make all efforts possible to cooperate with Europe in all areas. The efforts mentioned earlier such as the Culver-Nunn Amendment are major steps to show United States interest in reaching an equitable level of cooperation in arms trade and development.

Third, once all members of the Alliance have agreed on terms and concepts, the United States needs to pursue a policy of consistency toward Europe. Recent legislative and executive branch actions are substantial starts, but they need to continue in concert. This would insure that there would not be discord within the United States government which might lead to European uncertainty of US intentions. If Europe is certain of US military and political support along with the United States desire for European cooperation, it could reduce the chances of US/European relations remaining a matter of bilateralism.

While present actions of the American legislative and executive branch have been complementary, their efforts have often been at cross purposes in the area of European defense. Senator Mike Mansfield made repeated efforts from 1966 to 1971 to reduce the US military presence in Europe by 25 percent to 50 percent.³¹ While Senator Mansfield's efforts were unsuccessful, the closeness of the vote on many occasions caused the European Allies concern for the strength of the American

commitment and the ability of a US President to deliver on promises he might make.

Finally, the United States needs to develop its own foreign policy more coherently and understand the foreign policies of its European Allies better. With a cross section in NATO from Iceland to the United States, there is no possibility of the constant support of each nation for one another in all matters. The United States needs to understand the varied roles each NATO member seeks to play in the world and do its best to make all NATO members understand the world-wide role the US seeks for itself. A common position needs to be reached only in those areas which are perceived as vital interests for the security of the Alliance. The TNF upgrading mentioned earlier illustrated the Alliance's ability to do so. There is no reason why problems outside the concern of the Alliance should be seen as issues where NATO members must prove their fidelity to one another. However, the present economic and energy problems are undoubtedly making it more difficult to determine what areas do or do not fall under the area of the Alliance's vital interests.

All of these United States actions might improve the climate for European cooperation, but it is unlikely that they will provide the spark. That spark needs to come from within the nations of Europe; the governments of Western Europe must become persuaded that not only is it to their advantage to cooperate in defense matters but that it is imperative.

A major hope of many in Europe is the directly elected European Parliament. In its first year of action it has already addressed the defense issue several times. During its first working session in

Strasbourg in September 1979, the Parliament asked the Commission if it intended to contact NATO in order to help standardize weapons within the Nine. Communists, Socialists, and French Gaullists tried to block any defense-related debate but were unsuccessful.

In fact, discussion proceeded past industrial cooperation to the matter of security in general. Strasbourg's mayor, Mr. Pierre Pflimlin, was strongly supported when he stated that security was a vital concern which could not be ignored by the Parliament. Mr. Robert Jackson of Britain argued that the Treaty of Rome's reference to "peace and security" gave the Parliament the right to discuss defense, and he maintained that no EC institution can limit the discussion of Parliament. As a beginning, the EC industrial commissioner, Viscount Davignon, has agreed to produce a report suggesting areas of cooperation in arms industries, but for the present it will not involve military matters.³²

Finally, the greatest impetus for European cooperation will most likely once again come from the Soviet Union. As we saw in Chapter I, most of the political and economic cooperation and integration had some foundation or background in the fear of, or reaction to, Soviet actions. The fledgling efforts at armaments cooperation were founded in response to the massive Soviet conventional build-up in conjunction with the economic issues of weapons or weapons development. This perception and the orientation of governments referred to earlier as the "New Nationalism" make substantive progress difficult because of competing demands.

It appears then that it is up to the superpowers to a great extent whether or not Europe develops a defense policy. If the United States

is able to place the issues in a suitable environment and the Soviet Union continues to present a perceived threat, progress towards a European defense policy would be possible.

Proposals

The key to any solution of the problems of defense cooperation lies within the European Council. The nine members make up the entire core discussed in Chapter II along with two periphery members and one external nation. If these nations decide to take some first steps towards a more complete European defense effort, the framework for cooperation would then have come into being.

Pressure on the Council to take such action might come from several sides. The United States Congress has called for a European voice to deal in the US armaments market. The European Parliament in its role as the representatives of the European public and the Soviet Union's fostering of cooperative efforts through its continuing military build-up and acts of aggression such as in Afghanistan, are incentives for the EC to address security and economic related matters.

Efforts such as those by the European Parliament can bring the defense issues before the people of Europe and bring additional pressure on the individual nations in this manner. A September 1978 Harris-France poll in Le Monde showed some startling results concerning defense cooperation. Of those interviewed, 57 percent were in favor of a joint European defense program while only 17 percent were opposed.³³

Once the interest of the Council has been focused on this issue, structural problems could more easily be solved. A modified version

of the Klepsch Report could be adopted. The IEPG could become the focal point of this new cooperation; with its membership overlap between the EC and NATO, it could effectively bridge the gap between the two organizations.

In order to take on this role, the IEPG would need to be structured in a particular manner. The military-industrial panels and sub-groups of the IEPG roughly correspond to those of the Eurogroup. The difference would be that the long term harmonization of military training and policy called for in the Eurogroup's Eurolongterm section would need to be added. With no more than the implementation of these military and industrial efforts, major progress would have been made in defense cooperation.

The end result would then be the setting of general policy guidelines by the European Council for the IEPG. The IEPG would then be the European forum and would serve to coordinate the economic and military aspects: the economic issues would be coordinated through the EC Commission and its representative on the IEPG, while military issues would be coordinated through the Eurogroup and NATO.

Actual issues of trade or weapons development with the United States would be dealt with by the IEPG acting as the European spokesman. This would keep the EC from being seen as taking on military matters and would allow NATO to remain a collective defense organization for those nations not affiliated with the EC or the IEPG. No significant change would be required in any of the major organizations. Only the IEPG would be altered in this plan, and since it has been so far mostly an informal organization, it can be developed to fit the situation.

Thus, we have seen that defense policy cooperation and arms procurement cooperation are closely interrelated. The attainment of one calls for efforts towards the other. The framework for arms procurement cooperation is present and if the European powers were prepared to utilize it a European defense policy could then begin to develop.

However, as we said earlier, the European Council is the key to the overall issue. At present that does not bode well for the future development of a European defense policy. The Council has reached some common grounds, but usually in diplomatic generalities. Issues such as the EC search for an energy policy illustrate the difficulty of national leaders reaching common ground on sensitive problems. Supposedly established policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy present their own problems when some members such as Great Britain perceive their benefits as not being in accordance with their contribution. Tensions caused by current problems would undoubtedly have effects on a common policy being reached in other sensitive areas.

Thus, the framework for a European defense policy is present, but until some crisis forces European leaders of the Atlantic Alliance to see defense cooperation as their major need, the framework will most likely remain dormant.

FOOTNOTES

¹R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (New York: New York University Press, 1974)

²David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. 27, as quoted by Harrison, p. 28

³Ibid.

⁴Harrison, op. cit., p. 43

⁵Harrison, op. cit., p. 76

⁶Harrison, op. cit., p. 76, p. 84

⁷North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Eurogroup (Brussels, 1979), p. 2

⁸Max Kohnstamm, A Nation Writ Large? (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 141

⁹Stanley Hoffman, "The European Process at Atlantic Cross Purposes," Journal of Common Market Studies (February, 1965), 93, as quoted in Harrison, p. 61

¹⁰Harrison, op. cit., p. 61

¹¹U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and Readiness, HASC 92-72 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1259

¹²Ibid., p. 610

¹³Ellen Frost, NATO RSI: Towards a Common Defense Market, Memorandum for Distribution (Washington, U.S. Department of Defense, 1979)

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1

¹⁵EC Commission, Report on European Union (Luxembourg, 1975)

¹⁶Ibid., p. 25

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Leo Tindemanns, The European Union (Luxembourg, 1976) Report for the European Council

²⁰Ibid., p. 29

²¹European Communities, European Parliament, Report on European Armaments Procurement Cooperation (Luxembourg, 1978), Doc. 83/78

²²Ibid., p. 7

²³Ibid., p. 30

²⁴Lothar Rühl, The Nine and NATO (Paris, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1974)

²⁵Ibid., p. 44

²⁶Kohnstamm, op. cit.

²⁷Ibid., p. 150

²⁸Robert Close, Europe Without Defence? (New York, Pergamon Press, 1979), Chap. 3

²⁹Federal Minister of Defence, Defence White Paper, 1979 (Bonn, 1979), p. 28

³⁰Wolfgang Gerhart, "What About Multinational Corps in NATO?" Military Review, March, 1979, p. 32

³¹Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 214

³²The Economist (London), September 29, 1979, p. 60

³³The Economist (London), January 6, 1979, p. 34

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